[Previous page]...lo. Burr till
he came as a member of Senate. His conduct very soon inspired me
with distrust. I habitually cautioned Mr. Madison against trusting
him too much. I saw afterwards that under Genl W.'s and Mr. A.'s
admns, whenever a great military appmt or a diplomatic one was to be
made, he came post to Philada to shew himself & in fact that he was
always at market, if they had wanted him. He was indeed told by
Dayton in 1800 he might be Secy. at war; but this bid was too late.
His election as V. P. was then foreseen. With these impressions of
Colo. Burr there never had been an intimacy between us, and but
little association. When I destined him for a high appmt, it was out
of respect for the favor he had obtained with the republican party by
his extraordinary exertions and successes in the N. Y. election in
1800.
1806. April 15. About a month ago, Colo. Burr called on me &
entered into a conversation in which he [mentioned] that a little
before my coming into office I had written to him a letter intimating
that I had destined him for a high employ, had he not been placed by
the people in a different one; that he had signified his willingness
to resign as V. President to give aid to the admn in any other place;
that he had never asked an office however; he asked aid of nobody,
but could walk on his own legs, & take care of himself; that I had
always used him with politeness, but nothing more: that he aided in
bringing on the present order of things, that he had supported the
admn, & that he could do me much harm: he wished however to be on
differt. ground: he was now disengaged from all particular business,
willing to engage in something, should be in town some days, if I
should have anything to propose to him. I observed to him that I had
always been sensible that he possessed talents which might be
employed greatly to the advantage of the public, & that as to myself
I had a confidence that if he were employed he would use his talents
for the public good: but that he must be sensible the public had
withdrawn their confidence from him & that in a government like ours
it was necessary to embrace in its admn as great a mass of public
confidce as possible, by employing those who had a character with the
public, of their own, & not merely a secondary one through the Exve.
He observed that if we believed a few newspapers it might be supposed
he had lost the public confidence, but that I knew how easy it was to
engage newspapers in anything. I observed that I did not refer to
that kind of evidence of his having lost the public confidence, but
to the late presidential election, when, tho' in possn of the office
of V. P. there was not a single voice heard for his retaining it.
That as to any harm he could do me, I knew no cause why he should
desire it, but at the same time I feared no injury which any man
could do me: that I never had done a single act, or been concerned in
any transaction, which I feared to have fully laid open, or which
could do me any hurt if truly stated: that I had never done a single
thing with a view to my personal interest, or that of any friend, or
with any other view than that of the greatest public good: that
therefore no threat or fear on that head would ever be a motive of
action with me. He has continued in town to this time; dined with me
this day week & called on me to take leave 2. or 3. days ago. I did
not commit these things to writing at the time but I do it now,
because in a suit between him & Cheetham, he has had a deposn of Mr.
Bayard taken, which seems to have no relation to the suit nor to any
other object but to calumniate me. Bayard pretends to have addressed
to me, during the pending of the Presidl election in Feb. 1801,
through Genl. Saml. Smith, certain condns on which my election might
be obtained, & that Genl. Smith after conversing with me gave answers
from me. This is absolutely false. No proposn of any kind was ever
made to me on that occasion by Genl. Smith, nor any answer authorized
by me. And this fact Genl. Smith affirms at this moment. For some
matters connected with this see my notes of Feb. 12. & 14. 1801 made
at the moment. But the following transactions took place about the
same time, that is to say while the Presidential election was in
suspense in Congress, which tho' I did not enter at the time they
made such an impression on my mind that they are now as fresh as to
their principal circumstances as if they had happened yesterday.
Coming out of the Senate chamber one day I found Gouverneur Morris on
the steps. He stopped me & began a conversn on the strange &
portentous state of things then existing, and went on to observe that
the reasons why the minority of states were so opposed to my being
elected were that they apprehended that 1. I should turn all
federalists out of office. 2. put down the navy. 3. wipe off the
public debt & 4. That I need only to declare, or authorize my friends
to declare, that I would not take these steps, and instantly the
event of the election would be fixed. I told him that I should leave
the world to judge of the course I meant to pursue by that which I
had pursued hitherto; believing it to be my duty to be passive &
silent during the present scene; that I should certainly make no
terms, should never go into the office of President by capitulation,
nor with my hands tied by any conditions which should hinder me from
pursuing the measures which I should deem for the public good. It
was understood that Gouverneur Morris had entirely the direction of
the vote of Lewis Morris of Vermont, who by coming over to M. Lyon
would have added another vote & decided the election. About the same
time, I met with Mr. Adams walking in the Pensylve avenue. We
conversed on the state of things. I observed to him, that a very
dangerous experiment was then in contemplation, to defeat the
Presidential election by an act of Congress declaring the right of
the Senate to naming a President of the Senate, to devolve on him the
govmt during any interregnum: that such a measure would probably
produce resistance by force & incalculable consequences which it
would be in his power to prevent by negativing such an act. He
seemed to think such an act justifiable & observed it was in my power
to fix the election by a word in an instant, by declaring I would not
turn out the federal officers, not put down the navy, nor sponge the
National debt. Finding his mind made up as to the usurpation of the
government by the President of the Senate I urged it no further,
observed the world must judge as to myself of the future by the past,
and turned the conversation to something else. About the same time
Dwight Foster of Massachusetts called on me in my room one night &
went into a very long conversation on the state of affairs the drift
of which was to let me understand that the fears above-mentioned were
the only obstacles to my election, to all of which I avoided giving
any answer the one way or the other. From this moment he became most
bitterly & personally opposed to me, & so has ever continued. I do
not recollect that I ever had any particular conversn with Genl.
Saml. Smith on this subject. Very possibly I had however, as the
general subject & all its parts were the constant themes of
conversation in the private
tete a tetes with our friends. But
certain I am that neither he, nor any other republican ever uttered
the most distant hint to me about submitting to any conditions or
giving any assurances to anybody; and still more certainly was
neither he nor any other person ever authorized by me to say what I
would or would not do. See a very exact statement of Bayard's
conduct on that occasion in a piece among my notes of 1801. which
was published by G. Granger with some alterations in the papers of
the day under the signature of
....
Notes on Professor Ebeling's Letter of July 30, 1795
Professor Ebeling mentioning the persons in America from whom
he derives information for his wbe useful for him to know how far he
may rely on their authority.
President Stiles, an excellent man, of very great learning, but
remarkable for his credulity.
Dr. Willard. }
Dr. Barton }
Dr. Ramsay }
Mr. Barlow } All these are men of respectable characters worthy
of confidence as to any facts they may state, and rendered, by their
good sense, good judges of them.
Mr. Morse. }
Mr. Webster. } Good authorities for whatever relates to the
Eastern states, & perhaps as far South as the Delaware.
But South of that their information is worse than none at all,
except as far as they quote good authorities. They both I believe
took a single journey through the Southern parts, merely to acquire
the right of being considered as eye-witnesses. But to pass once
along a public road thro' a country, & in one direction only, to put
up at it's taverns, and get into conversation with the idle, drunken
individuals who pass their time lounging in these taverns, is not the
way to know a country, it's inhabitants, or manners. To generalize a
whole nation from these specimens is not the sort of information
which Professor Ebeling would wish to compose
his work from.
Fenno's Gazette of the U.S. }
Webster's Minerva. }
Columbian centinel. } To form a just judgment of a country
from it's newspapers the character of these papers should be known,
in order that proper allowances & corrections may be used. This will
require a long explanation, without which, these particular papers
would give a foreigner a very false view of American affairs.
The people of America, before the revolution-war, being
attached to England, had taken up, without examination, the English
ideas of the superiority of their constitution over every thing of
the kind which ever had been or ever would be tried. The revolution
forced them to consider the subject for themselves, and the result
was an universal conversion to republicanism. Those who did not come
over to this opinion, either left us, & were called Refugees, or
staid with us under the name of tories; & some, preferring profit to
principle took side with us and floated with the general tide. Our
first federal constitution, or confederation as it was called, was
framed in the first moments of our separation from England, in the
highest point of our jealousies of independance as to her & as to
each other. It formed therefore too weak a bond to produce an union
of action as to foreign nations. This appeared at once on the
establishment of peace, when the pressure of a common enemy which had
hooped us together during the war, was taken away. Congress was
found to be quite unable to point the action of the several states to
a common object. A general desire therefore took place of amending
the federal constitution. This was opposed by some of those who
wished for monarchy to wit, the Refugees now returned, the old
tories, & the timid whigs who prefer tranquility to freedom, hoping
monarchy might be the remedy if a state of complete anarchy could be
brought on. A Convention however being decided on, some of the
monocrats got elected, with a hope of introducing an English
constitution, when they found that the great body of the delegates
were strongly for adhering to republicanism, & for giving due
strength to their government under that form, they then directed
their efforts to the assimilation of all the parts of the new
government to the English constitution as nearly as was attainable.
In this they were not altogether without success;insomuch that the
monarchical features of the new constitution produced a violent
opposition to it from the most zealous republicans in the several
states. For this reason, & because they also thought it carried the
principle of a consolidation of the states farther than was requisite
for the purpose of producing an union of action as to fore...
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