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his idea of it from this history alone, he would suppose the
republican party (who were in truth endeavoring to keep the
government within the line of the Constitution, and prevent it's
being monarchised in practice) were a mere set of grumblers, and
disorganisers, satisfied with no government, without fixed principles
of any, and, like a British parliamentary opposition, gaping after
loaves and fishes, and ready to change principles, as well as
position, at any time, with their adversaries.
But a short review of facts omitted, or uncandidly stated in
this history will shew that the contests of that day were contests of
principle, between the advocates of republican, and those of kingly
government, and that, had not the former made the efforts they did,
our government would have been, even at this early day, a very
different thing from what the successful issue of those efforts have
made it.
The alliance between the states under the old articles of
confederation, for the purpose of joint defence against the
aggression of Great Britan, was found insufficient, as treaties of
alliance generally are, to enforce compliance with their mutual
stipulations: and these, once fulfilled, that bond was to expire of
itself, & each state to become sovereign and independant in all
things. Yet it could not but occur to every one that these separate
independencies, like the petty States of Greece, would be eternally
at war with each other, & would become at length the mere partisans &
satellites of the leading powers of Europe. All then must have
looked forward to some further bond of union, which would ensure
internal peace, and a political system of our own, independant of
that of Europe. Whether all should be consolidated into a single
government, or each remain independant as to internal matters, and
the whole form a single nation as to what was foreign only, and
whether that national government should be a monarchy or republic,
would of course divide opinions according to the constitutions, the
habits, and the circumstances of each individual. Some officers of
the army, as it has always been said and believed (and Steuben and
Knox have even been named as the leading agents) trained to monarchy
by military habits, are understood to have proposed to Genl.
Washington to decide this great question by the army before it's
disbandment, and to assume himself the crown, on the assurance of
their support. The indignation with which he is said to have scouted
this parricid proposition, was equally worthy of his virtue and his
wisdom. The next effort was (on suggestion of the same individuals,
in the moment of their separation) the establishment of an hereditary
order, under the name of the Cincinnati, ready prepared, by that
distinction, to be engrafted into the future frame of government, &
placing Genl. Washington still at their head. The General (* 1)
wrote to me on this subject, while I was in Congress at Annapolis,
and an extract from my answer is inserted in 5. Marshall's hist. pa.
28. He afterwards called on me at that place, on his way to a
meeting of the society, and after a whole evening of consultation he
left that place fully determined to use all his endeavors for it's
total suppression. But he found it so firmly riveted in the
affections of the members that, strengthened as they happened to be
by an adventitious occurrence of the moment, he could effect no more
than the abolition of it's hereditary principle. He called again on
his return, & explained to me fully the opposition which had been
made, the effect of the occurrence from France, and the difficulty
with which it's duration had been limited to the lives of the present
members. Further details will be found among my papers, in his and
my letters, and some in the
Encyclop. Method. Dictionnaire d'Econ.
politique, communicated by myself to M. Meusnier, it's author, who
had made the establishment of this society the ground, in that work,
of a libel on our country. The want of some authority, which should
procure justice to the public creditors, and an observance of
treaties with foreign nations, produced, some time after, the call of
a convention of the States at Annapolis. Altho' at this meeting a
difference of opinion was evident on the question of a republican or
kingly government, yet, so general thro' the states, was the
sentiment in favor of the former, that the friends of the latter
confined themselves to a course of obstruction only, and delay, to
every thing proposed. They hoped that, nothing being done, and all
things going from bad to worse, a kingly government might be usurped,
and submitted to by the people, as better than anarchy, & wars
internal and external the certain consequences of the present want of
a general government. The effect of their manoeuvres, with the
defective attendance of deputies from the states, resulted in the
measure of calling a more general convention, to be held at
Philadelphia. At this the same party exhibited the same practices,
and with the same views of preventing a government of concord, which
they foresaw would be republican, and of forcing, thro' anarchy,
their way to monarchy. But the mass of that convention was too
honest, too wise, and too steady to be baffled or misled by their
manoeuvres. One of these was, a form of government proposed by Colo.
Hamilton, which would have been in fact a compromise between the two
parties of royalism & republicanism. According to this, the
Executive & one branch of the legislature were to be during good
behavior, i. e. for life, and the Governors of the states were to be
named by these two permanent organs. This however was rejected, on
which Hamilton left the Convention, as desperate, & never returned
again until near it's final conclusion. These opinions & efforts,
secret or avowed, of the advocates for monarchy, had begotten great
jealously thro' the states generally: and this jealousy it was which
excited the strong oppositon to the conventional constitution; a
jealousy which yielded at last only to a general determination to
establish certain amendments as barriers against a government either
monarchical or consolidated. In what passed thro' the whole period
of these conventions, I have gone on the information of those who
were members of them, being absent myself on my mission to France.
(* 1) See his lre., Apr. 8, 84.
I returned from that mission in the 1st. year of the new
government, having landed in Virginia in Dec. 89. & proceeded to N.
York in March 90. to enter on the office of Secretary of State. Here
certainly I found a state of things which, of all I had ever
contemplated, I the least expected. I had left France in the first
year of its revolution, in the fervor of natural rights, and zeal for
reformation. My conscientious devotion to these rights could not be
heightened, but it had been aroused and excited by daily exercise.
The President received me cordially, and my Colleagues & the circle
of principal citizens, apparently, with welcome. The courtesies of
dinner parties given me as a stranger newly arrived among them,
placed me at once in their familiar society. But I cannot describe
the wonder and mortification with which the table conversations
filled me. Politics were the chief topic, and a preference of
kingly, over republican, government, was evidently the favorite
sentiment. An apostate I could not be; nor yet a hypocrite: and I
found myself, for the most part, the only advocate on the republican
side of the question, unless, among the guests, there chanced to be
some member of that party from the legislative Houses. Hamilton's
financial system had then past. It had two objects. 1st as a
puzzle, to exclude popular understanding & inquiry. 2dly, as a
machine for the corruption of the legislature; for he avowed the
opinion that man could be governed by one of two motives only, force
or interest: force he observed, in this country, was out of the
question; and the interests therefore of the members must be laid
hold of, to keep the legislature in unison with the Executive. And
with grief and shame it must be acknoleged that his machine was not
without effect. That even in this, the birth of our government, some
members were found sordid enough to bend their duty to their
interests, and to look after personal, rather than public good. It
is well known that, during the war, the greatest difficulty we
encountered was the want of money or means, to pay our souldiers who
fought, or our farmers, manufacturers & merchants who furnished the
necessary supplies of food & clothing for them. After the expedient
of paper money had exhausted itself, certificates of debt were given
to the individual creditors, with assurance of payment, so soon as
the U. S. should be able. But the distresses of these people often
obliged them to part with these for the half, the fifth, and even a
tenth of their value; and Speculators had made a trade of cozening
them from the holders, by the most fraudulent practices and
persuasions that they would never be paid. In the bill for funding &
paying these, Hamilton made no difference between the original
holders, & the fraudulent purchasers of this paper. Great & just
repugnance arose at putting these two classes of creditors on the
same footing, and great exertions were used to pay to the former the
full value, and to the latter the price only which he had paid, with
interest. But this would have prevented the game which was to be
played, & for which the minds of greedy members were already tutored
and prepared. When the trial of strength on these several efforts
had indicated the form in which the bill would finally pass, this
being known within doors sooner than without, and especially than to
those who were in distant parts of the Union, the base scramble
began. Couriers & relay horses by land, and swift sailing pilot
boats by sea, were flying in all directions. Active part[n]ers &
agents were associated & employed in every state, town and country
neighborhood, and this paper was bought up at 5/ and even as low as
2/ in the pound, before the holder knew that Congress had already
provided for it's redemption at par. Immense sums were thus filched
from the poor & ignorant, and fortunes accumulated by those who had
themselves been poor enough before. Men thus enriched by the
dexterity of a leader, would follow of course the chief who was
leading them to fortune, and become the zealous instruments of all
his enterprises. This game was over, and another was on the carpet
at the moment of my arrival; and to this I was most ignorantly &
innocently made to hold the candle. This fiscal maneuvre is well
known by the name of the Assumption. Independantly of the debts of
Congress, the states had, during the war, contracted separate and
heavy debts; and Massachusetts particularly in an absurd attempt,
absurdly conducted, on the British post of Penobscot: and the more
debt Hamilton could rake up, the more plunder for his mercenaries.
This money, whether wisely or foolishly spent, was pretended to have
been spent for general purposes, and ought therefore to be paid from
the general purse. But it was objected that nobody knew what these
debts were, what their amount, or what their proofs. No matter; we
will guess them to be 20. millions. But of these 20. millions we do
not know how much should be reimbursed to one state, nor how much to
another. No matter; we will guess. And so another scramble was set
on foot among the several states, and some got much, some little,
some nothing. But the main object was obtained, the phalanx of the
treasury was reinforced by additional recruits. This measure
produced the most bitter & angry contests ever known in Congress,
before or since the union of the states. I arrived in the midst of
it. But a stranger to the ground, a stranger to the actors on it, so
long absent as...
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